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JURISDICTION 
This matter involves an appeal from a District Court 
divorce case. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 . Did the District Court properly award Respondent a 
future interest in a Defined Benefit Retirement Plan following 
a post-trial hearing which was but one in a series of post-trial 
hearings, all heard and decided before the entry of the Decree? 
At trial, the Court, divided the cash retirement plans of both 
parties, along with other property that had ascertainable cash 
values. The issue of possible unknown retirement rights was 
reserved at trial, and later argued and decided on October 31, 
2005. The issue was addressed at trial on April 23, 2004 
(Record, p. 1019; Apr. 23, 2004 Tr. at 19-20), and in subsequent 
hearings on December 9, 2004 (Record, p. 1020; Dec. 9, 2004 Tr. 
at 53-56) and October 31, 2005, (Record, p. 1021; October 31, 
2005 Tr. at 23-47). A trial court's property distribution in a 
divorce decree will not be overturned by the Appellate Court 
except for abuse of discretion, which did not occur in the 
instant case. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 
1988). 
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2. Although a Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered, 
it was actually entered the same date as the Decree of Divorce 
(August 28, 2006). Regardless of how the document was titled, 
it really was not a Supplemental Decree nor was it a nunc pro 
tunc order, but was part of the final Decree, and the Court was 
consistent in dividing all of the retirement funds as of the 
trial date. No legal error occurred, and using the trial date 
as the date for division of property is within the discretion of 
the Court. 
3. The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel claimed by the 
Appellant does not apply to this case because there was no prior 
judicial proceeding. This matter consists of a series of 
hearings in the same case over a lengthy period of time, 
culminating in a Decree and Supplemental Decree signed the same 
date, in August 2006. Judicial Estoppel deals with situations 
where the same parties are involved in two different cases. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Appeal challenges the division of Petitioner's Defined 
Benefit Pension Plan, the existence of which was alleged at the 
Trial. Petitioner did not know such a plan existed, but 
consented to divide any plan later discovered. The issues of 
whether such a plan existed and how to divide it were raised at 
the Trial in April 2004 and a series of hearings thereafter, 
culminating in a hearing in October 2005, when the Trial Judge 
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heard argument and divided the plan pursuant to Woodward. 
Finally, in August 2006, the Court signed a Decree, Findings, 
and a Supplemental Decree, all on the same date, ordering the * 
plan divided. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellee agrees with Appellant's statement on Pages 2 and 
3 of the Appellant's Brief regarding the course of proceedings, 
and incorporates Appellant's Exhibits "A" (copy of UCA 30-3-5, 
"B" (Decree of Divorce), "C" (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law), "D" (Supplemental Decree of Divorce), and "F" (Motion 
with attachments), and will refer to those exhibits throughout 
this Brief. 
Additionally, however, the trial court held a hearing on 
October 31, 2005 (Record, p. 1021; Tr. of October 31, 2005, at 
23-47; Exhibit "A" to this Brief) where the parties argued the 
issue of dividing the Defined Benefit Retirement Plan which had 
been discovered by that time. The Court made findings in that 
hearing upon which the Supplemental Decree of Divorce was based. 
Pages 23-49 of that hearing transcript are attached to this 
Brief as Exhibit "A". 
Also, due to the protracted nature of this case, the trial 
court bifurcated the proceedings and entered an Order of Divorce 
on December 16, 2004 (Record, p. 538). 
This Appeal resulted. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the April 2004 Trial, the Court discussed the various 
retirement accounts of the parties. In its April 23, 2004 
ruling, the Court totaled up four retirement accounts owned by 
the Petitioner/Appellee and three retirement accounts owned by 
the Respondent/Appellant, and awarded Petitioner a difference of 
$17,762 (Record, p. 1019; April 23, 2004 Transcript, P.21). The 
Court's Findings of Fact (Exhibit "C", Appellant's Opening 
Brief; Record, p. 968), at Paragraphs 68 and 69, as well as the 
identical provisions of the Decree of Divorce (Exhibit "B", 
Appellant's Opening Brief; Record, p. 990), at Paragraphs 40 and 
41, found and ordered that all of those referenced accounts were 
"definitive cash amounts". The Court's statement, which the 
Appellant characterizes as a Finding, is found at Page 1019 of 
the Record, April 23, 2004, Transcript, Pages 19 and 20: 
"THE COURT: That's okay. With regard to retirement 
there are a couple of exhibits I want to have in front of me as 
we discuss through retirement. I think it will be healthiest 
for both parties if we split of the retirement as opposed to 
ordering a Woodward share to the extent we have knowledge and 
ability to do that. 
So if we go to Exhibit G of the petitioner. Then for 
the respondent there were actually a couple places where that 
came up. It's both on his Exhibit 1, which is kind of the his 
master exhibit, and then on his Exhibit 7. It came in those two 
places. Here is my best view of this. We've stipulated that 
there is going to be a review of this T-Mobile account. And if 
there is value there then there will be credit placed on the 
petitioner's side with regard to the T-Mobile retirement. 
My best view then in addition to that is that the 
petitioner's retirement consists of $18,166.98 with the Delta 
Family Care Savings Plan, $3,502.16 with American General 
Financial, $2,340.80 with the Delta Sky Share Stock and 
$5,607.32 with American Scandia Annuity for a total of 
$29,617.26. And then you'll have to add to that any T-Mobile." 
(Record, p. 1019; April 23, 2004 Tr. at 19:18-25; 20:1-13). 
(emphasis added). 
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Respondent claimed Petitioner had a T-Mobile retirement 
account, and the Court ruled that a credit would be placed on 
the Petitioner's side if such an account was later discovered. 
As it turned out, there was no such thing as a T-Mobile 
retirement. 
The Findings, Paragraph 72, provide as follows (Record, p. 
968; Exhibit "C" of Appellant's Opening Brief): 
"72. The Court finds that, based upon the agreement 
of the parties, if the Petitioner has additional retirement with 
Delta Air Lines, T-Mobile, the Respondent may be entitled to a 
credit for his one-half (1/2) interest. The Respondent 
represented that he sent a subpoena requesting the records." 
(emphasis added) 
The parallel paragraph in the Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 
36 of the Decree, states in its entirety as follows (Record, p. 
990; Exhibit "B" of Appellant's Opening Brief): 
"36. The Court orders that, based upon the agreement 
of the parties, if the Petitioner has additional retirement with 
Delta Air Lines, T-Mobile, the Respondent may be entitled to a 
credit for his one-half (1/2) interest. The Respondent 
represented that he sent a subpoena requesting the records. The 
Court has addressed this item in the Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce." (emphasis added) 
Appellant's counsel signed the Findings and the Decree 
'Approved as to Form'. 
In his Statement of Facts (Page 3, Opening Brief), 
Appellant states that Respondent was found to have interests in 
three retirement accounts, including a small Defined Benefit 
Plan. This statement appears to be erroneous; the Court found 
that Respondent had "definitive cash amounts" in three 
retirement accounts. (Findings of Fact, Paragraph 69; Decree of 
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Divorce, Paragraph 41.) Counsel has not found any reference in 
the Record or the Findings to any Defined Benefit Plan except 
for the one owned by Petitioner, confirmed after the Trial and 
discussed at length on October 31, 2005 (Record, p. 1021; 
Exhibit "A" to this Brief; Tr of October 31, 2005, pages 23-47). 
The Court's finding at the April 2004 Trial was that it 
would be best if the seven known retirement accounts, which were 
all cash accounts, be divided as part of the property 
settlement. The Court divided them as cash, allowing each party 
to keep their respective accounts and making up the difference 
in a global property division. The Court decided that any 
after-discovered account of the Petitioner would be divided, but 
the Court assumed any such account would be a cash account 
(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005 
Tr., p. 44, 20-25; p. 45, 1-14). 
By the time of the December 9, 2004 hearing (Record, Page 
1020; December 9, 2004 Tr. p. 53-56), the parties were still 
waiting for information regarding either a T-Mobile Retirement 
Account or a Delta Retirement Account. As the record indicates, 
the argument was over whether there had been a roll-over of the 
account, and whether the same account was being added twice to 
Petitioner's retirement rights. The Court stated that a 
judgment would be entered for Respondent in the amount of one-
half, and the issue would be addressed in some sort of judgment 
(Record, p. 1020; December 9, 2004, Tr., p.55, 14-16; p.56, 3-
6). Although Petitioner's counsel stated they would be happy to 
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give credit if another account was found, the Court actually 
concluded that there would be a judgment granted if one were 
found. 
By this time, it was apparent the matter would not be 
resolved soon, so the Court bifurcated the proceedings and 
granted an Order of Divorce (reserving all other issues) which 
was entered on December 16, 2004 (Record, p. 538). 
Also on December 9, 2004, the Court resolved the issue of 
completing the previously ordered property settlement. Although 
there was not yet any actual order signed and entered, the Court 
made a verbal order at the April 2004 Trial, which required 
Respondent to pay Petitioner approximately $106,000. At the 
December 9, 2004 hearing, the parties discussed and presented 
arguments regarding how and when Mr. Lamano would pay Mrs. 
Lamano that sum, and ultimately the Court stated, at Page 46 of 
the Transcript, as follows: 
"THE COURT: So what we are contemplating then is another 
provision somewhat similar to Paragraph 74. I mean, you're 
probably looking still at a 45- to 90-day time frame for these 
things, and then a judgment entering, if nothing has happened in 
that period of time." (December 9, 2004 Tr., p. 46, 13-18). 
Thereafter, Respondent made payments to Petitioner of 
$39,340.61 on March 25, 2005, and $62,478.24 on May 11, 2005 
towards the amount due from him for the property settlement 
order. See the Affidavit of Petitioner in Support of Motions 
for Judgment Regarding Medical Bills and Judgment Regarding 
Property Equalization Balance (Record, p. 927). 
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It was ultimately discovered that Petitioner had a Defined 
Benefit Plan called the Delta Family Care Retirement Plan, and 
no T-Mobile account was ever discovered (Record, p. 1021; 
Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005, Tr. p. 23-47). 
The Court held a hearing October 31, 2005, to consider how 
to deal with Petitioner's Defined Benefit Plan. The Court 
concluded that no further hearing would be necessary and divided 
that plan according to the Woodward formula. The division was 
made effective April 20, 2004, the date of the Trial and the 
date of the property division. As stated in the Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce (Record, p. 915; Exhibit "D", Appellant's 
Opening Brief), this division date was consistent with the other 
retirement divisions made by the Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Supplemental Decree of Divorce, entered the same date 
as the Decree and Findings, awarded the Respondent his Woodward 
Share of the Petitioner's Defined Benefit Retirement Plan. All 
the other retirement plans were cash accounts, and the Trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion in differentiating a Defined 
Benefit Plan from cash retirement plans. Although there were 
proffers by the Petitioner at the trial and on December 9, 2004 
agreeing to give credit for any after-discovered plan, and 
statements by the Court that either credit or a judgment would 
be granted, there was no final order or any definitive finding 
based on known facts until October 31, 2005. In any event, the 
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Court is not bound to accept stipulations of the parties. The 
Trial Court did not error in refusing to hold that Petitioner 
was estopped from changing her position. 
The Respondent's Woodward interest in Petitioner's Defined 
Benefit Plan was properly determined as of the trial date. All 
the other property was divided as of that date. The trial date 
is the date upon which the Court should normally divide 
property. 
The Court's Decrees and Orders should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION OCCURRED REGARDING 
DIVISION OF RETIREMENT RIGHTS. 
A. IT WAS PROPER FOR THE COURT TO AWARD RESPONDENT A 
WOODWARD INTEREST OF A DEFINED BENEFIT RETIREMENT PLAN, AND IT 
WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE COURT TO REFUSE SETTING 
OFF A DEFINED BENEFIT RETIREMENT PLAN INTEREST AGAINST THE 
PROPERTY DIVISION. 
At Trial, the Court divided the cash assets of the parties, 
including the known retirement accounts. The retirement 
accounts were, in essence, divided equally, by awarding each 
party his or her funds and then calculating the difference as an 
amount owed by Mr. Lamano to Mrs. Lamano, since the total of his 
cash accounts was larger. 
Technically, the Woodward formula was used, because that 
case allows the courts to divide retirement funds or retirement 
rights accumulated during the marriage as property. If the 
entire fund or right was accumulated during the marriage, and if 
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it is a cash account, then the division is normally one-half to 
each party, which is what occurred here. If future, post-
divorce retirement accumulations are anticipated, such as is the 
case with a Defined Benefit Plan, then a formula is used which, 
in effect, awards the owner of the plan 100% of the accumulation 
after the date of trial, but divides equally that portion 
accumulated during the marriage. 
The determination of retirement rights and the application 
of a formula to those rights is entirely within the discretion 
of the Court. 
In the instant case, Respondent alleged at trial and 
continued to allege thereafter, at a series of follow-up 
hearings, that Petitioner had a plan which had not been 
revealed. In effect, at the Trial in April 2004 the Court 
reserved ruling on that issue pending further discovery, and 
such was still the status of the matter at the December 9, 2004 
hearing. 
By the time of the hearing on October 31, 2005, the 
respondent had received information, through a subpoena, 
establishing the existence of Petitioner's Defined Benefit Plan. 
Petitioner did not know of the existence of the plan. As the 
proffered evidence at the October 31, 2005 hearing established, 
the plan was entirely funded by petitioner's employer, Delta 
Airlines, and petitioner made no contributions thereto. 
Furthermore, as it turns out the Respondent was only half 
correct about Petitioner having another plan. Apparently at 
10 
Trial Respondent claimed that Petitioner had a plan known as T-
Mobile, and it turns out there was no such plan, although 
Respondent's inquiries did ultimately result in locating a Delta 
Family Plan. 
The Court reserved the issue of what to do with any later 
disclosed or discovered retirement plan at trial, reserved that 
issue again at the hearing on December 9, 2004, and then 
resolved the issue at the October 31, 2005 hearing. 
Respondent's counsel admitted that the issue had been 
reserved when, at the October 31, 2005 hearing, he stated: 
"MR. SMITH: I think we—I'm not asking to reopen the 
trial, because my understanding is this particular issue has 
always been sort of held open. But, yes, I think—in order to 
deal with this asset fairly, I think you—you're going to have 
to take some supplemental evidence and have some supplemental 
findings." (Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; Tr. 
October 31, 2005, p. 37, 1-7). 
Even though the three documents ultimately signed in August 
2006 were styled as a Decree of Divorce, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Decree, in reality they were 
part and parcel of the same ultimate decision. The Decree of 
Divorce entered in August 2006 purports to divorce the parties, 
even though they were actually divorced in December 2004. The 
Decree of Divorce refers to the Supplemental Decree signed the 
same date in August 2006. (Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 36.) 
Given the fact that two years and four months elapsed 
between the Trial and the Court finally signing written orders, 
it is understandable that the parties and counsel were in all 
likelihood happy to have anything signed, and didn't want to 
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risk spending several more months correcting the Decree to 
clarify that the parties had already been divorced, and folding 
the provisions of the Supplemental Decree into the Decree and 
Findings, which would have required additional redrafting of all 
documents. 
Thus, the Defined Benefit Plan was discovered and the 
parties argued the disposition of the same before the Court, 
prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, as part of a 
continuing process involving a series of hearings, and after the 
respondent had paid petitioner $100,000 of the $106,000 that he 
owed her as part of the Court ordered property division (Record, 
p. 927). 
The Court properly decided that the Defined Benefit Plan 
was not amenable to division and cash offset because it's 
current value could not be accurately determined, nor would a 
judgment in favor of Respondent have been equitable, so the 
Court applied the Woodward formula (Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" 
to this Brief; October 31, 2005 Tr. p. 47, 1-12). 
Respondent's own proffer at the October 31, 2005 hearing 
established that Mrs. Lamano's Defined Benefit Retirement was 
not a cash account, would not begin paying until October 1, 
2019, would only pay monthly payments for Mrs. Lamano's 
lifetime, was a Defined Benefit Plan entirely funded by the 
employer without any employee contributions, and the owner of 
the plan, Delta Airlines, did not make any calculations as to 
present value (Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; 
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October 31, 2005 Tr. p. 25, 22-5; p. 26, 1-19). (Also, see 
Exhibit "F", Appellant's Opening Brief, Delta letter of March 
17, 2005.) 
Mr. Lamano's other proffered exhibit at the October 31, 
2005 hearing, a letter from an actuary, was based upon unaudited 
information provided apparently by Mr. Lamano (Record, p. 987; 
Exhibit "F", Appellant's Opening Brief, letter of April 22, 
2005). A present value was stated as of May 1, 2005, based 
upon mortality tables and a projected interest rate. Both these 
are just guesses. The letter also states that the ultimate 
benefit payable from any Defined Benefit Plan is heavily 
dependent upon participant's earnings in the future (the years 
immediately preceding retirement), and then proceeded to take 
into account unknown future salary increases, again providing 
merely a guess. 
The Court considered the following factors in reaching its 
decision: 
1. The proffered letter from Delta dated March 17, 2005. 
2. The other (cash) retirements were divided as of the 
trial date, and the Court had "hard numbers' upon which to base 
that decision (Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; 
October 31, 2005 Tr., p. 28, 24-25; p. 29, 1-6). 
3. The animosity between the parties, which dictated 
dividing property as cleanly as possible (Record, p. 1021; 
Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005 Tr., p. 29, 1-6). 
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4. The fact that the "cash" property division had already 
been accomplished (Record, p. 1021, Exhibit "A" to this Brief; 
October 31, 2005 Tr., p. 32, 16-25; p. 33, 1-19). 
5. The Defined Benefit Plan was not easily divisible 
(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005 
Tr., p. 34, 19-25; p. 35, 1-9; p. 36; 4-6). 
6. The Defined Benefit Plan was not a cash account, and 
attempting to assign a cash value presented too many "variables" 
(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005 
Tr., p. 37, 14-25; p. 38, 1-6 and line 25; p. 39, 1-11; p. 41, 
12-23 and line 25; p. 42, 1-6). 
The Trial Court decided that using the Woodward formula was 
the most equitable method of dividing that particular account 
because it was not a cash account and a formula was the best way 
to deal with future uncertainties. In Bailey v. Bailey, 745 
P. 2d 830 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this court stated that the 
distribution of retirement benefits should generally be 
postponed until the benefits are received or at least until the 
earner is eligible to retire. Also see Woodward v. Woodward/ 
656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE ANY 
STIPULATION, AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO DO SO. 
Mr. Lamano urges the Court to find that there was actually 
a stipulation between the parties regarding division of the 
unknown retirement plan. Although that might be considered the 
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case, based upon Trial counsel's statement, there is no evidence 
that the Court accepted any stipulation regarding the retirement 
plans. Stipulations of parties in divorce cases serve only as 
recommendations to the Court. See Jones v. Jones, P. 2d 222 
(Utah, 1943). 
An agreement or stipulation between parties in a divorce 
case is not binding upon the Court, but serves only as a 
recommendation. Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944 (Utah, 
1953) . 
The divorce court is under no obligation to adhere to an 
agreement between the parties, since the distribution of 
property is a matter within the Court's discretion. Klein v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah, 197 5) . 
Mr. Lamano claims that the Court accepted the stipulation 
made at Trial. In fact, the stipulation was to the effect that 
there would be a review of a T-Mobile Account, which turned out 
not to exist, and if there was value there, there will be credit 
placed on the Petitioner's side (Record, p. 1019; April 23, 2004 
Tr. at 20:3-7). 
On December 9, 2004, Mrs. Lamano's counsel, referring to 
the T-Mobile Account, referenced that there would be an off-set, 
and if there was another account, and it wasn't the same account 
that had been rolled over, they would be happy to give credit as 
an off-set (Record, p. 1020; December 9, 2004 Tr. at 55:2-7). 
Despite that stipulation or proffer, the Court then stated as 
follows: 
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"Well, I guess if the time has passed, then you end up 
getting a judgment for the amount of the one-half." (December 
9, 2004 Tr. at 55:14-16.) 
A few paragraphs later, the Court stated: 
"I mean, if you get something within the 45- to 90-day 
period that we're contemplating here, then we can readdress it. 
Otherwise, if would probably have to be addressed in some sort 
of judgment." (December 9, 2004 Tr. at 56:3-6.) 
According to his Exhibit "F" attached to his Opening Brief, 
Mr. Lamano did not file a Motion for an evidentiary hearing 
regarding the Petitioner's retirement plan until July 15, 2005, 
far more than 45 to 90 days from the December 9, 2004 hearing, 
and long after Mr. Lamano had already paid virtually all of the 
property settlement ordered (Record, p. 927). 
Thus, the Court did not accept any stipulations, or such 
acceptance was conditional at best. The conditions were not 
met, and the Trial Court was faced with a situation where the 
cash property division had already occurred, and a Defined 
Benefit Plan needed to be equitably divided. 
At the October 31, 2005 hearing the Court stated he never 
anticipated a difference in the type of retirement account 
(Record, p. 1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; Tr. October 31, 
2005 hearing, p. 45, lines 9-11). 
This fact, standing by itself, would be a basis for the 
Court to decline to accept a stipulation, even if the Court had 
previously agreed to accept it. The Court retains the 
discretion to change its thinking under the circumstances of 
this case. 
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Mr. Lamano argues that the Court assigned a present value 
to one of his retirement plans which was a Defined Benefit 
Retirement Plan, but neither the Record nor the Brief reflect 
any such fact. The Court was certainly entitled to make an 
appropriate decision under the circumstances, which could hardly 
be referred to as "reversing course" as characterized by Mr. 
Lamano. 
II. 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel doesn't apply in this 
case, because there was not a prior judicial proceeding. 
This was all one case, stretched out over several years. 
As the record reflects, there was a Trial in 2004, followed 
by a lengthy series of hearings, discussions, and Orders to Show 
Cause, all culminating in a Decree, Findings, and Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce that finally resolved the case in August of 
2006. 
To take a series of hearings in the same case and apply the 
Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel is to distort that doctrine beyond 
recognition. 
Even if the Court believes that the Doctrine of Judicial 
Estoppel applies, the doctrine certainly does not over-ride the 
Trial Court's duty in a divorce case to exercise its 
jurisdiction to reach an equitable property division, nor does 
it over-ride the Court's right to decline acceptance of a 
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stipulation, or revisit a decision once all the facts are known. 
This issue was not raised below. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN MAKING 
ITS ORDER EFFECTIVE AS OF THE DATE OF TRIAL. 
Appellant claims the Trial Court entered it's order nunc 
pro tunc and it was a retroactive order. 
The Trial Court's Order has nothing to do with entering a 
Decree retroactive or nunc pro tunc. As noted, the Record 
established that a trial occurred, followed by at least two 
hearings to resolve issues not fully decided at the Trial with 
all final orders signed and entered the same day in August 2006. 
The Trial Court divided all property as of the Trial date, 
and it was proper to divide the Defined Benefit Pension as of 
the same date. The general rule is that a marital estate is 
valued at the time of the Divorce Decree. (See Rappleye v. 
Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct. App. 1983); Morgan v. Morgan, 
795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, a review of those 
cases establishes that the time of the Divorce Decree is 
normally meant to be the time of the Trial or within a short 
time following the Trial. In this particular case, the parties 
were actually divorced in December, 2004 (Record, Page 538). 
This case was bifurcated, and even though the Decree 
entered in August of 2006 purportedly divorces the parties, they 
were actually divorced long before that. 
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Mr. Lamano complains that Petitioner's counsel "slipped the 
retroactivity language into the final version of the 
Supplemental Divorce Decree", ignoring the fact that counsel 
himself was sent a copy of that Decree on or about August 16, 
2006, and made no objection thereto. 
The Supplemental Decree is not a nunc pro tunc order. It 
was entered the same date as the Decree and the Findings, and 
the Decree itself, Paragraph 36, refers to the Supplemental 
Decree. They were part and parcel of the Court's Order on the 
same date. 
Furthermore, this issue was not raised during the 
proceedings below. In fact, Appellant's counsel conceded that 
the issue of dividing after-discovered retirement plans had been 
reserved by the Trial Court for further hearing (Record, p. 
1021; Exhibit "A" to this Brief; October 31, 2005, Tr., p. 37, 
1-3). 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's decision should be affirmed. Dividing 
the Appellee's Defined Benefit Plan using a formula was entirely 
reasonable, fair and equitable under the circumstances, and 
completely within the Court's discretion. 
DATED this / z ^ day of ^fA? 2007. 
jptfTj. BUNDERSON 
y^TTORNEY FOR PETITIONER/APPELLEE 
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relationship with each other, and historically that has 
not occurred. I guess you can put in language that both 
parties will cooperate and leave it very nebulous to 
that effect, and that Mr. Lamano will be responsible to 
pay all fees in a timely manner, which would perhaps 
resolve that issue to that regard. 
MR. SMITH: We would so stipulate. 
THE COURT: Let's give it a try. 
MR. BAILEY: Okay. I will add that in. 
MR. SMITH: Thank you. 
MR. BAILEY: Now I think we're back on 72. 
THE COURT: Anything other than 72, Mr. Smith? 
MR. SMITH: I think with respect to the 
stipulated items, we're in agreement and that leaves 
only 72. 
THE COURT: And then you're going to--other 
than 72, you're going to make these changes and--
MR. BAILEY: Yeah, and I'll meet with Brad to 
make sure we accurately reflect--
THE COURT: Okay. All right, then. Let's talk 
about the retirement issue. 
MR. BAILEY: The Court will recall at the time 
of trial the Court had several retirements in front of 
it (inaudible) cash values. 
THE COURT: All that could be easily 
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liquidated. 
MR. BAILEY: Yeah. IRAs, KEOGHs, or whatever 
they were, they had a cash balance. And both parties 
submitted extensive evidence regarding them. I went 
back and look at my trial binders and Mr. Echard had 
subpoenaed Delta regarding retirements. Apparently did 
not receive that. My client was asked does she have 
another retirement and said, "No." Mr. Lamano testified 
he thought she had a retirement with T-Mobile. 
And at that point, at the time of trial, we 
acknowledged that if there was another retirement, then 
he would be entitled to his one-half share. I think 
that finding 72 says they'd have to share it. 
We have subsequently been provided by Delta, 
through Mr. Echard's subpoena--and I have attached that 
--I think Brad has attached it to his motion--an 
acknowledgment by letter dated March 23rd of 2005 that 
there was a (inaudible)--or a Delta Family-Care 
Retirement Plan in existence. 
Now, this was way longer than the 3 0 days we 
were told we were going to get that information. But 
that's fine. I mean, what's fair is fair. And my 
client has no problem giving Mr. Lamano his share under 
the Woodward decision, because if--and I refer to the 
Court a letter from a Chris Collins, Manager Employee 
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1 and Service Center, by letter of March 17th of x05, 
2 indicating that there is a defined-benefit plan that the 
3 company is the sole one who contributes to, that the 
4 employee cannot contribute to. And if I may read what I 
5 think to be the portion (inaudible). 
6 THE COURT: Is this something we should just 
7 accept as a piece of evidence? 
8 MR. BAILEY: Well, they have. 
9 MR. SMITH: Yeah. I accept that the letter 
10 says what it says, yeah. We have no objection to the 
11 Court receiving it. 
12 THE COURT: (Inaudible) with a sticker on it? 
13 MR. BAILEY: It's probably my only copy. 
14 THE COURT: Oh. 
15 MR. BAILEY: But it's in my reply. 
16 MR. SMITH: It's in--it's before the Court in 
17 the pleadings relating to--
18 THE COURT: Go ahead and just read, then, 
19 what--
20 MR. BAILEY: If I may read it. 
21 THE COURT: Yeah. 
22 MR. BAILEY: And we have no trouble... It is 
23 entitled "Pamela Lamano has met the 100 percent vesting 
24 requirements (completion of five years' accredited 
25 service) under the Delta Family Care Retirement Plan (a 
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1 defined-benefit pension plan). For purposes of this 
2 benefit calculation, benefit accruals include total 
3 participation in the plan from the Delta seniority date 
4 of August 5, 1987 through February 28 of 2005," which is 
5 probably in conjunction with the subpoena. 
6 "It is assumed that the single-life annuity 
7 payments are to be made for the participant's lifetime 
8 only. The monthly benefit payable at 65 on October 1, 
9 2019 is in the amount of $727.29. Delta Airlines does 
10 not compute the 'present value7 or the 'marital portion' 
11 of a retirement benefit from the plan. The plan is a 
12 defined-benefit plan which is entirely employer funded 
13 and neither requires nor allows employee contributions. 
14 "Any 'present value' or 'marital portion' would 
15 have to be determined through an outside source, such as 
16 a pension actuary. Enclosed is a copy of the summary 
17 plan description, administrative procedures for 
18 processing domestic relation orders and our model 
19 order." And then, "If you have any questions." 
20 I guess the argument comes down to this, Your 
21 Honor. If that plan would have been discussed at the 
22 time of trial as a defined-benefit plan, categorically 
23 and historically defined-benefit plans have been divided 
24 under Woodward, the Supreme Court decision saying that 
25 if it's difficult, if you have to assume too much, then 
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1 the simple way and the most appropriate way to handle it 
2 is through filing a (inaudible). 
3 Mr. Lamano would have received his share under 
4 Woodward. Where we have fundamental differences is the 
5 fact that in Mr. Lamano's request he has utilized an 
6 actuary to go back and calculate what his entitlement 
7 would be based upon, as I recall, $73 7 during the period 
8 of time that he and Ms. Lamano were married in which she 
9 was employed at Delta. 
10 THE COURT: Well, wasn't that amount based on a 
11 February 28, 2005--
12 MR. BAILEY: No. 
13 THE COURT: --end date? 
14 MR. BAILEY: No. Because what you have to do 
15 is--if you look at it is the monthly benefit payable at 
16 65 on October 1, 2019 is in the amount of $727.29. 
17 THE COURT: Yeah, but wasn't that based on— 
18 wasn't the $727 based on a February 2005 date? 
19 MR. BAILEY: No. For the--it says for the 
20 purposes--well, the benefit calculation--benefit 
21 accruals include total participation in the plan from 
22 the Delta seniority date of August 5th through--of '87 
23 through February 28th of 2005. 
24 It is assumed that the single-life annuity 
25 payments are to be made for the participant's lifetime 
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only. The monthly benefit payable at 65 on October 1st 
is $727.29. That's if she retires in the year 2019, 
that's the amount she would get based upon the plan at 
that point. That's what she--
THE COURT: So it has no regard--no relation to 
February of 2005? 
MR. BAILEY: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. (Inaudible.) 
MR. BAILEY: What they're saying is--
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. BAILEY: --the retirement that he would be 
entitled to receive is no different than he would be 
entitled than that, had we defined it or identified it 
on the date we filed. 
I think to go back, have an actuary compute the 
$727 or the figure that is used in Mr. Lamano's motion 
and creating a claim for an offset isn't consistent with 
the Woodward decision; isn't consistent with what this 
Court would do and has done in the past. And he has not 
shown where he has been prejudiced by anything by 
retaining his share. As the letter says, file the QDRO. 
THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Bailey. 
MR. BAILEY: Sure. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, I didn't mean to cut you 
off. I perceive a big part of the reason I divided 
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1 retirement up on the date of trial was I was able to, 
2 the hard numbers were in front of me. And also, it 
3 seemed to be advisable to do that in light of the 
4 animosity that existed between the parties, to split 
5 things up as much as possible. Was there another reason 
6 you recall why I did that at that point in time? 
7 MR. BAILEY: That was the only information that 
8 the Court had, were plans that had calculable amounts of 
9 money in them. It's easy, if there were $28,335, to 
10 divide it. This is not that type of plan. 
11 Now, the Court, as I recall, in that decision 
12 left open, based upon the facts that were before it at 
13 the time, or language to that effect--
14 THE COURT: Very limited facts. 
15 MR. BAILEY: Yeah. Nobody knew, and despite 
16 allegations or assertions that my client was trying to 
17 hide anything--if she was called to testify, she would 
18 say, I didn't know anything about it. I don't make any 
19 contributions. The Delta stewardesses or--in which this 
20 plan (inaudible) are not a union, so it's not a union-
21 type of information. She didn't realize she had it. 
22 And I would tell the Court that I've looked at 
23 her payroll records. I wouldn't have picked it up 
24 either. But he is entitled to his retirement share. He 
25 is entitled to his Woodward share, and I think that's 
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1 appropriate. 
2 THE COURT: Let me allow Mr. Smith to address 
3 me on this one. 
4 MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll try to 
5 be brief and (inaudible) . 
6 The Court's specific ruling in this case on 
7 April the 23rd was, "I think it will be healthiest for 
8 both parties if we split"--off is what I think you 
9 meant. It says "of" in the transcript--"so that"--
10 THE COURT: What page are--what page are you 
11 on? 
12 MR. SMITH: Page 19, line 17--18 through 23. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
14 MR. SMITH: uIf we split off the retirement, as 
15 opposed to ordering the Woodward share, to the extent we 
16 have knowledge and ability to do that." 
17 THE COURT: Well--
18 MR. SMITH: Based on that ruling, Mr. Bailey 
19 has prepared findings that reference this in paragraph 
20 72, specifically saying that if there's something out 
21 there Mr. Lamano would be entitled to a one-half 
22 interest. 
23 At this point, Mr. Lamano is concerned because 
24 this is an issue that he has diligently attempted to get 
25 information from Ms. Lamano on. Early on in this case, 
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1 in 2000--2001, Ms. Lamano answered interrogatories in 
2 which she said there is just the 401(k)-type retirement, 
3 nothing else. In fairness, when you're asked what 
4 retirement you have it seems reasonable that it's 
5 incumbent on you to make a reasonable inquiry. An 
6 inquiry into the terms of her employment would indicate 
7 that there was such a retirement out there. 
8 As we sit here today, there is another paper 
9 that's in front of the Court. Mr. Bailey has read to 
10 you from Chris Collins7 letter indicating that Delta 
11 does not compute present value or the marital portion. 
12 Mr. Lamano has retained the services of an actuary who 
13 has made that computation--and that is in front of you 
14 as part of our July 18, 2005 submission--in which he 
15 values it at $100,326. 
16 THE COURT: But you'll agree that's not 
17 admissible in its current form. To the extent you want 
18 to get that in front of me, there would have to be an 
19 evidentiary hearing. 
20 MR. SMITH: There would be, Judge. 
21 THE COURT: Because everything there is 
22 hearsay. 
23 MR. SMITH: Well, it's hearsay that probably 
24 comes in by virtue of an expert testimony. But I would 
25 agree with you; we would have to qualify the individual 
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1 and--
2 THE COURT: In its current form. 
3 MR. SMITH: --lay the foundation. I would 
4 agree with that. 
5 And so my point here, though, is really there's 
6 two issues. We are clearly in agreement on the first 
7 and threshold issue. There is no--although we have not 
8 always been in agreement on this issue, as recently as 
9 May the assertion was this account doesn't exist. 
10 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
11 MR. SMITH: And so now we are clearly in 
12 agreement that there is a defined-benefit plan that 
13 Ms. Lamano is the beneficiary of and that is appropriate 
14 for division as a marital asset. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. SMITH: That then takes us to the second 
17 step, which is how. At this point, our position is 
18 simply this: It's fundamentally unfair to say, Well, 
19 we're going to apply a Woodward formula. Because what 
20 we've done is--although we don't yet have a final order, 
21 Mr. Lamano has gone ahead and performed his obligations 
22 under what will be the final order to the tune of a 
23 little more than a hundred thousand dollars, which 
24 included compensating Ms. Lamano for the differential in 
25 the cash-type retirement accounts they have. 
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1 THE COURT: Was that a hundred thousand 
2 dollars? 
3 MR. SMITH: It included that. It was--I 
4 believe the retirement balancing portion of that--
5 THE COURT: But there were a lot of other 
6 things. 
7 MR. SMITH: Correct. Correct. 
8 THE COURT: And so the retirement wasn't a 
9 hundred thousand? 
10 MR. SMITH: The retirement was not a hundred 
11 thousand. I believe it was some--I want to say $17,000 
12 or $18,000 of the hundred. My point is, however, she's 
13 been paid for that. 
14 THE COURT: She's been paid the $18,000? 
15 MR. SMITH: Right, and--
16 THE COURT: Short a little bit that is still--
17 MR. SMITH: Short a little bit, about $4,000. 
18 But it amounts to something a little more than a hundred 
19 grand. 
20 The Court made a ruling, as you've indicated, 
21 based on the best facts you had in front of you at the 
22 time. Our position is Ms. Lamano could and should have 
23 known better. And, in fact, when this was brought up 
24 before in the December 23rd--or the December 9th hearing 
25 that the Court held, the express representation was that 
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if there is an account out there, it will be credited as 
an offset. 
At this point there is some unfairness, both 
procedural and substantive, in saying, Well, yeah, now 
that you've proven there's an account, now we'll change 
horses and say this one asset we're going to apply the 
Woodward division. 
One last point, Your Honor, and then--
THE COURT: Let me address you on that before 
you move on. The reason I was able to divide the 
$36,000 to get the $18,000 was because there was a cash 
value that was readily available--
MR. SMITH: They were 401(k) accounts. 
THE COURT: --and easy to determine. There 
were no assumptions that the Court needed to make 
whatsoever. And the thought was to the extent we can 
divide things, since there's so much acrimony, it is 
best for both parties to divide as much as we can. 
This retirement plan is not easily divisible. 
There are assumptions that your--though I'm saying it's 
not admissible, I've certainly looked at it. There are 
assumptions that he had to make to arrive at a present-
value figure that he arrived--that he arrived at. 
MR. SMITH: Sure. 
THE COURT: I think the $727 is inaccurate. 
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1 What do you think? 
2 MR. SMITH: On the $727, as I read the letter 
3 all I can say is what I take from that, which is $727 
4 represents the amount Ms. Lamano would receive at 
5 retirement in 2 019 if her employment stopped as of 
6 February 2005. That's--all I can say is that's how I 
7 read the letter. 
8 THE COURT: That causes me some concerns 
9 (inaudible). 
10 MR. SMITH: I think that--and I think that goes 
11 directly to the concerns, Your Honor. At this point 
12 making a determination as to how to treat this asset, 
13 you may not have sufficient facts. And based on the 
14 record you have to simply say, Well, Woodward 
15 automatically applies, in my mind it would not be fair 
16 either. 
17 Woodward, you'll recall, involved two separate 
18 issues. The first issue in Woodward was whether this 
19 type of defined-benefit retirement account was a marital 
20 asset at all. The second issue was how--if it is, how 
21 do you divide it up? There's nothing in Woodward that 
22 says you must divide it up by some sort of deferred 
23 division. 
24 In fact, subsequent case law suggests that one 
25 of the criteria you would use in making the 
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1 determination to have an immediate division is the 
2 acrimony of the parties, so that we're not having some 
3 proceeding in 2 019 to figure out what to do. 
4 THE COURT: But the other variables--but the 
5 other considerations are the ability to be accurate in 
6 your immediate division. 
7 MR. SMITH: And that is certainly true, Judge. 
8 And the question is: Based on the current state of 
9 affairs, can an actuary provide testimony to the Court, 
10 to a reasonable degree of actuarial certainty, whatever 
11 that might mean, that would give the Court a basis to do 
12 that? To say that there's no way to do it today, 
13 there's no record before you that allows us to reach 
14 that point, for sure. 
15 There's nothing before the Court to say that 
16 this asset is intrinsically incalculable. In fact, to 
17 the extent that the letter might--from my actuary might 
18 mean anything, it suggests that it can be calculated. 
19 THE COURT: So you would like to reopen the 
20 trial--
21 MR. SMITH: Well, and on this--
22 THE COURT: --to--
23 MR. SMITH: I'm sorry. 
24 THE COURT: I'm just trying to understand where 
25 you're going, so let me allow you to tell me. 
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MR. SMITH: I think we--I'm not asking to 
reopen the trial, because my understanding is this 
particular issue has always been sort of held open. 
But, yes, I think--in order to deal with this asset 
fairly, I think you--you're going to have to take some 
supplemental evidence and have some supplemental 
findings. 
I certainly do not want to be heard to say, 
uDon't enter these findings while we sort out this 
issue." These findings preserve this issue, but yes I 
think before you can say this is an incalculable asset 
there is additional evidence that has to be in front of 
the Court. 
THE COURT: But wouldn't you agree I don't have 
to say it's an incalculable asset? I could find that I 
have concerns about the variables to the extent that I 
determine the fairest way would simply be to use 
Woodward. 
MR. SMITH: If I may speak very directly, Your 
Honor. I certainly believe you have the ability to say 
that. Based on the record before you, I believe it 
would be an abuse of discretion to do so. 
THE COURT: Oh, because I divided up things 
that were absolute amounts that could easily be divided? 
There were no variables on any of the other retirement 
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plans. 
MR. SMITH: And that may be, Your Honor. On 
this particular account, even the existence of the 
variables is an assumption we're making, not a fact. 
THE COURT: Discount rate's got to be a 
variable. 
MR. SMITH: Sure. Is that a--yeah, that's 
absolutely true. That's certainly not a variable that 
the courts--the appeals courts have considered as one 
which would preclude a present-valuation calculation. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SMITH: I mean, in Woodward—if I can just 
briefly address--in Woodward--one of the variables, for 
example, in Woodward itself, was the individual had a 
long-time--10 or 15 years to work before retirement and 
there was a question of if he worked through a certain 
period of time--it was a federal civil service 
retirement of some sort--there was an amount the 
government would match, if he worked the entire period 
of time. 
That was a variable that was out there. And 
the Court said, Based on that, maybe you shouldn't have 
an immediate valuation. But one of the other variables 
was ability to satisfy it. 
THE COURT: How about the bankruptcy of Delta 
38 
Airlines? 
MR. SMITH: I don't know that we--I certainly 
believe the Court can take judicial notice of the fact 
that Delta Airlines has filed bankruptcy. What, if any, 
the effect of that is on their retirement plan, or on 
the presently vested portion of a retirement plan, I 
have no idea. 
THE COURT: You're going to present that 
evidence, though? 
MR. SMITH: I think I would be obligated to, 
yes. 
MR. BAILEY: I would get to the point, Your 
Honor, at the time of trial if the Court was aware that 
this was a defined-benefit plan, the appropriate mode at 
that point would be, one, give to Mr. Lamano, which he's 
entitled to receive, his Woodward share. That takes out 
all of the assumptions. It takes out all of the 
variables. What it is is what it is. 
What he hasn't said today is how he is unfairly 
treated. He gets the same interest he would have 
received in April of 20 04 right now; nothing more, 
nothing less. 
THE COURT: Well--I mean, I--I tend to agree 
with you, Mr. Bailey. Part of me is inclined to let 
them try to prove otherwise. I think it's an uphill 
39 
1 battle, Mr. Smith. And, of course, the attorney's fees 
2 would have to be left open. Do you want to do a — 
3 MR. SMITH: Those are my instructions. 
4 THE COURT: Well, let's get everything else 
5 down and I'll set an evidentiary hearing for you. How 
6 long do you want? 
7 MR. SMITH: I would think we could put on our 
8 portion of the matter in a couple of hours, so I would 
9 say half a day. 
10 MR. BAILEY: Well, again, I'm opposed to that, 
11 Your Honor--
12 THE COURT: I know you are. 
13 MR. BAILEY: --for the same reason that we're 
14 going over it. Again, this is not a monetary 
15 retirement. This is a fixed defined-benefit plan that 
16 my client makes no contribution. And had the Court--had 
17 it been here on--in April, you would have done the same 
18 thing that you would have done, and that is give him the 
19 Woodward share of this retirement. And I'm asking the 
20 Court not to prolong this case. This case is an 
21 (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: Well, we're going to have 
23 everything else done, because--
24 MR. BAILEY: Well, (inaudible) in April of 2 0 04 
25 and again we're going over the same amount of problems 
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1 that we had, assumptions, assumptions, assumptions. And 
2 that's exactly what Woodward addressed, was you take out 
3 the assumptions on any defined-benefit plan. No 
4 different than the federal civil service that my friend 
5 Mr. Smith referred to in Woodward--and I had the second 
6 Woodward case — or what this Court would receive. It's a 
7 defined-benefit plan. 
8 THE COURT: So you're saying that even if I 
9 heard the testimony from their expert--
10 MR. BAILEY: It's still an assumption and a 
11 guess and--
12 THE COURT: He would have to make an assumption 
13 on the discount rate, you agree with that? 
14 MR. SMITH: I wouldn't use the word 
15 "assumption," but I know what you mean. And, yes, he 
16 would have to--he would have to pick one and be able to 
17 justify it, yes. 
18 THE COURT: Well, okay, maybe that isn't a good 
19 word. He would have to — 
20 MR. LAMANO: (Inaudible.) 
21 MR. SMITH: Yes, sure. 
22 THE COURT: It's a variable that different 
23 experts could vary on. 
24 MR. SMITH: You bet. 
25 THE COURT: And then there would have to be an 
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1 opinion with regard to Delta's stability. Of course, 
2 they would--they would have to present that, Mr. Bailey, 
3 to show--
4 MR. BAILEY: Well, I guess--
5 THE COURT: --that it would be the same 
6 regardless of what happened to the company. 
7 MR. BAILEY: What I had--my feeling is--on 
8 this, Your Honor, is again I've been before this Court 
9 on other divorce cases with defined-benefit plans and 
10 the--
11 THE COURT: I agree. 
12 MR. BAILEY: --Court has been very consistent 
13 with it. If Mr. Lamano doesn't like it, his recourse is 
14 to the Court of Appeals. And if he wants to do that, 
15 that's his decision. But I think it's appropriate that 
16 he gets his Woodward share. We're now talking another 
17 $4,000 in fees and costs and the likelihood of his 
18 ability to show that there is a set amount is very 
19 difficult, not to mention creating a lot of problems now 
20 trying to go back through and offset actions that took a 
21 year-and-a-half (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: Well, and I've expressed if he's 
23 unable to show that, then there would be attorney's 
24 fees. 
25 MR. BAILEY: Well, and I understand that, but 
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what you're saying is--let's say for argument's sake 
that he is--somewhere his guy comes up with what the 
figure was he had, 53,000 bucks. Well, that now has 
created its own dilemma in renegotiating property issues 
involving these two parties. 
THE COURT: You're saying even at that point in 
time Woodward would be appropriate because of where we 
are today? 
MR. BAILEY: That's right. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me allow you to address 
me on that one, Mr. Smith. 
MR. SMITH: Very briefly, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sitting as a court of equity. 
MR. SMITH: Sitting as a court of equity, you 
may very well already have reached the point where, 
irrespective of my ability or inability to establish the 
factors we've been speaking about, you would still feel 
it appropriate to apply the Woodward formula. I would 
not agree that that was appropriate, but I would agree 
that that's within the Court's discretion to do. 
And I certainly would recognize that if 
Mr. Lamano disagrees with that, as Mr. Bailey says, his 
recourse is to the Court of Appeals. And if that's 
where we're at, I suppose efficiency would dictate that 
you make that finding. 
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1 Having said that, three points. Number one, as 
2 a court of equity, I believe that it's--it's as I've 
3 indicated, fundamentally unfair to allow a party to 
\ either knowingly or unknowingly--I'm not making that 
) value judgment. But to have failed to reveal 
information clearly within their ability to control, 
allow a state of affairs to be created, represent to the 
Court if such and such a thing happens we're still going 
to allow it as an offset, and allow things to progress, 
and then when the facts turn out to be different than 
you have been wagering all along then to say, Oh, well, 
if you had known about this back at trial you surely 
would have done it this way--I recognize what you're 
saying, that the retirement assets in front of you at 
trial were more easily calculable. 
THE COURT: Well, what you're saying there is 
you want to punish the Petitioner for her lack of 
diligence, or whatever you want to call it. Isn't there 
another way to do that besides what you're suggesting? 
MR. SMITH: The Court certainly has a whole 
range of options to do that. We need--one way of doing 
it, Judge, is--as we've indicated, when you've taken a 
position in court, then you're stuck with it. 
THE COURT: Well, but you understand that 
position wasn't made with the knowledge that this was a 
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defined-benefit plan. 
MR. SMITH: No, I don't agree with that, Judge. 
By the time we got--
THE COURT: Well, I'm telling you then. 
MR. SMITH: Well, I realize that was your 
position. 
THE COURT: From my point of view--
MR. SMITH: Sure. I--
THE COURT: --I had no understanding that this 
was a defined-benefit plan or that--that there even was 
a plan. 
MR. SMITH: And I apologize (inaudible). 
THE COURT: If I had known it was a defined-
benef it plan, I wouldn't have made that statement. 
MR. SMITH: And I'm sorry, I've been unclear in 
what I'm referring to. 
THE COURT: Well, that's okay. 
MR. SMITH: Ms. Lamano, is what I'm referring 
to, in the December hearing took the position if there 
is this amount out there, it will be applied as an 
offset. And at that point everybody's saying it's some 
sort of retirement account not of the 401(k) or cash 
contribution variety. We've now progressed and that's 
where we're at. 
And in all fairness, my client's frustration is 
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this: He's had to refinance. He's had to come up with 
the money, all of the money that he was required to. 
And he--his comment to me I think is appropriate to 
quote to the Court. If it's good for the goose, it's 
got to be good for the gander. 
And we started off in one position and we're 
kind of in this bind because Ms. Lamano represented a 
certain set of facts to the Court and decisions were 
made based on that set of facts. And now, as it turns 
out, they're of a different variety. And on this 
particular issue, of a type that the Court has no choice 
but to deal with. 
THE COURT: Is it of any consequence that of 
that only approximately two-tenths was related to this 
retirement? 
MR. SMITH: I think that is a relevant fact, 
and I'm not trying to suggest otherwise. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SMITH: Based on--
THE COURT: You wanted to tell me some other 
things, though. 
MR. SMITH: I think that covers it, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SMITH: I'll submit the matter on that 
basis. 
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THE COURT: All right. Sitting as--two things. 
Sitting as a court of equity, given the case where it is 
today, to the extent you want to bring a motion for 
contempt relating to her discovery violations, I will 
consider that separately. 
I'm going to order the Woodward formula. I 
think Mr. Bailey is exactly right. If it had been 
presented to me at the time of trial with regard to this 
unique retirement account, that's what I would have 
ordered, because it wasn't easily divisible at that 
point in time based on assumptions--variables that would 
have to be filled in. 
I understand--let me also say this, though. I 
understand that--well, contempt is a separate issue that 
you can bring, if you wish to. I understand there has 
been time, effort and attorney's fees involved in 
pursuing the finding and then bringing it to the Court's 
attention, this account. 
There has also been a fair amount of time spent 
by Mr. Bailey in responding to the objections to the 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that 
were submitted back in February of 2005 by Respondent. 
Since that time, through discussions, 
Respondent has withdrawn at least seven of those 
objections, after having found that there actually was a 
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record made of the January 13, 2005 telephone 
conference. To Respondent's credit, the other matters 
that we've worked through were matters we did need to 
work through. But there were seven objections made in 
that initial filing in February of 2005 that have since 
been summarily withdrawn that Mr. Bailey didn't have to 
take the time to respond to, but he did. 
Again, sitting as a court of equity, I--he has 
requested attorney's fees for the time and effort he has 
put in. I'm going to offset those fees with the fees 
that counsel has had to incur in pursuing this 
retirement issue. 
That will be the order of the Court. 
Are there any other issues I haven't addressed, 
Counsel? 
MR. BAILEY: No, Your Honor. I'll prepare the 
findings and submit them to Mr. Smith. If we need to, 
I'm happy to get together with Brad. 
MR. SMITH: Very well. 
THE COURT: All right. If you have any 
questions--let me--and I think I offered this before--
get Leila on the phone, get me on the phone with the two 
of you, let's try to get them talked through and 
resolved as quickly as possible. 
MR. BAILEY: We will. In fact, I'll try and 
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have a copy of t h i s t o Brad by t h i s week. 
MR. SMITH: Very w e l l . 
THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . Thank you, 
(The h e a r i n g was c o n c l u d e d . ) 
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